In-Depth Analysis· Türkiye defense industry domestic production rate 80 percent

Is Türkiye's Defense Industry 80% Domestic? What the Figure Measures and What It Does Not

How Turkish officials describe the roughly 80 percent domestic production rate in Türkiye's defense industry, what it captures, and what it leaves out.

BTT

By By the Text Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 10 min read (2,164 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

Turkish officials, including the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), describe the domestic production (localization) rate of Türkiye's defense industry as around 80 percent.
A single headline rate is an aggregate: it does not by itself show how local content is distributed between simple components and critical subsystems such as engines, sensors and seekers.
Programs like Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Hürjet, KAAN, Fırtına, MİLGEM, TCG Anadolu, ATMACA and HİSAR-O differ widely in how much was designed, integrated and manufactured in Türkiye.
Independent analysts and foreign media generally agree that Türkiye's industrial rise is real, but they emphasize remaining dependence on imported engines and electronics in some platforms.
Ankara presents the industry as a strategic force multiplier for counter-terrorism, the Blue Homeland and allied cooperation, shaped by arms-export restrictions imposed on Türkiye after 2019.

Why It Matters

Turkish officials say the domestic production rate of Türkiye's defense industry is around 80 percent. That claim is often repeated in headlines without an explanation of what it measures. The figure is best read as an official aggregate indicator of localization, not as a statement that every part of every system is made in Türkiye. Understanding the difference helps readers judge both Ankara's achievement and the criticisms made by independent analysts.

This guide explains how the figure is described in Turkish official statements, what any localization rate can and cannot capture, and how nine well-known systems illustrate the range. It deliberately avoids unverified numbers: where a precise figure is not publicly documented, it says so.

Background

How the rate is described officially

The Presidency of Defense Industries (Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı, SSB), which reports to the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, is the main body that publishes and repeats the domestic production rate. Statements by the President and by SSB leadership usually contrast the present level, described as around 80 percent, with a much lower level in the early 2000s, when Türkiye relied heavily on imported finished systems. The Ministry of National Defense (MSB) uses similar language in its briefings on the national defense industry.

Two caveats follow from the way these statements are framed:

The methodology is not published in full detail in widely available form. Readers should treat the figure as an official indicator and cite it as such, using wording like 'according to SSB' or 'Turkish officials say'.
The rate is usually presented at the level of projects or the sector as a whole, not as a line-by-line bill of materials for each platform.

Why Türkiye pursued localization

Several events shaped the policy. Türkiye's NATO membership since 1952 meant decades of procurement from allied suppliers. From the 1990s onward, Ankara reported delays and restrictions on some arms transfers during counter-terrorism operations. In 2019 several European governments restricted arms exports to Türkiye after Operation Peace Spring, and Canada suspended and later revoked export permits for certain surveillance sensors used on drones. In July 2019 the United States removed Türkiye from the F-35 program after Türkiye acquired the Russian S-400 system, and in December 2020 Washington imposed CAATSA sanctions on the SSB. These events reinforced the argument in Ankara that dependence on foreign licences carries strategic risk. For a broader view, see the sister publication's analysis of Türkiye's defense industry at 80% domestic production.

What a localization rate may and may not capture

No single percentage can answer every question. The following distinctions matter when reading any national localization claim, in Türkiye or elsewhere.

Dimension	What a headline rate may capture	What it may not capture
Project-level vs sector-level	Share of programs led by domestic firms	Variation between individual platforms
Components vs systems	Share of parts, labor or value made locally	Whether the hardest parts are local
Design vs production	Local assembly and integration	Who owns the design authority and intellectual property
Critical subsystems	Contribution of domestic electronics and software	Dependence on imported engines, seekers, sensors or chips
Value vs count	Share of contract value kept in-country	Dependence on a few foreign suppliers for key inputs

Different countries use different definitions, so cross-country comparisons of 'percent domestic' are rarely like for like. Readers should check whether a given figure refers to contract value, number of parts, or the share of programs under national control.

Key Players & Positions

Turkish institutions and industry

SSB (Presidency of Defense Industries): Sets procurement strategy and publishes the localization narrative, citing a rise from low levels in the early 2000s to about 80 percent.
MSB (Ministry of National Defense): Presents domestic systems as operationally proven in counter-terrorism and naval operations.
Companies: ASELSAN (electronics), Roketsan (missiles), Baykar (unmanned aircraft), Turkish Aerospace/TUSAŞ (aircraft), TEI (engines), MKE (land systems and ammunition), and shipyards including the Istanbul Naval Shipyard and private yards such as Sedef.

Allies and partners

NATO partners see Türkiye as a major contributor to the Alliance, with its second-largest army by personnel in much common reporting and a growing industrial base. Allied governments have at times restricted transfers for political reasons, while also buying, co-developing or evaluating Turkish products. The sister publications Interstate Journal and The Worldlogue discuss the NATO context and export diplomacy in more depth.

Independent analysts and foreign media

Think tanks, defense journals and international outlets generally describe two things at once: a real and fast expansion of Turkish design and production capacity, and continuing reliance on imported engines, optics and electronic components in several platforms. SIPRI's arms-transfer data, for instance, record both Türkiye's rise as an exporter and the shifting pattern of its imports, and several Turkish firms appear in SIPRI's Top 100 arms-producing companies lists. Analysts often argue that the more useful question is not 'what percent' but 'which critical subsystems remain imported, and how fast are they being replaced'.

Nine Systems: What the Public Record Shows

The table below summarizes widely reported facts. It does not give per-system percentages, because credible public figures are generally not available.

System	Domestic role (as presented in Turkish sources)	Commonly noted foreign elements or caveats
Bayraktar TB2	Designed and produced by Baykar; domestic avionics, ground control and increasingly domestic sensors such as ASELSAN's CATS	Early series used a foreign-made engine and a Canadian electro-optical sensor; export restrictions pushed substitution
Akıncı	Larger Baykar UCAV with domestic airframe and mission systems	Early aircraft widely reported to use Ukrainian-origin turboprop engines; domestic engine work by TEI is cited as the long-term path
Hürjet	TUSAŞ advanced jet trainer and light combat aircraft, designed in Türkiye	Reported to use a US-origin turbofan engine, making export dependent on third-country approvals
KAAN	National fifth-generation fighter; prototype first flew on 21 February 2024	Prototype flew with US-made engines; the indigenous TF35000 engine is under development
Fırtına (T-155)	Produced in Türkiye with local integration	Based on licensed South Korean K9 Thunder technology
MİLGEM	National corvette/frigate program, built in Turkish shipyards with a strong domestic combat-system component	Propulsion and some sensors in early ships were of foreign origin; later ships emphasize replacement
TCG Anadolu	Built at Sedef Shipyard in Istanbul and commissioned on 10 April 2023; presented as the flagship of Türkiye's naval aviation, including drones	Design adapted from a Spanish Navantia amphibious ship design
ATMACA	Roketsan anti-ship cruise missile in service with the Turkish Navy, with domestic seeker and guidance	Propulsion history is cited by analysts; domestic engine substitution is a stated goal
HİSAR-O	Medium-altitude air-defense system developed by ASELSAN and Roketsan	Dependence is usually discussed in terms of specific electronics, not the system architecture

Three lessons emerge. First, 'domestic' can mean design authority, final assembly, subsystem manufacture, or all three. Second, engines are the most frequently cited weak point and also the area where Türkiye is investing heavily. Third, licensed production (Fırtına) and co-developed designs (TCG Anadolu) are legitimate parts of industrial strategy, but they are not the same as a wholly indigenous design.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Texts

Türkiye's Position

According to Turkish official sources, the national defense industry is a core element of the country's security doctrine rather than a purely commercial sector. The main points, as stated by the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), the Ministry of National Defense (MSB) and the Presidency, are:

Domestic production reduces strategic vulnerability. SSB and Presidency statements argue that a domestic rate of around 80 percent, together with ongoing work on engines and critical components, reduces the risk of political arms-export restrictions, as seen after 2019. Ankara links this to national security and to its NATO responsibilities.
Force multiplier in counter-terrorism. The MSB credits systems such as the Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Kargu and national electronic warfare systems with improving precision and protection of civilians during operations against PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG (a group listed as terrorist by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union) and DAESH. Ankara frames these operations, including the Claw series, Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring and Spring Shield, as exercises of the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. See the sister publication on Türkiye's security doctrine and defense industry.
Enabler of the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan). Turkish official statements present MİLGEM ships, TCG Anadolu, ATMACA missiles and Turkey's indigenous drilling and seismic fleet as tools for protecting maritime jurisdiction areas, which Ankara argues should be delimited on the principle of equity under international law. The same position is reflected in Türkiye's 2025 Marine Spatial Planning, registered with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025.
Allied cooperation and NATO context. Turkish officials stress that domestic production strengthens the Alliance, pointing to Türkiye's long NATO membership, its role in Alliance operations, and cooperation or exports with allied and partner states. Ankara's NATO diplomacy also refers to the Alliance's collective commitment to higher defense and security spending, agreed at the 2025 Hague summit, as one reason for deeper industrial cooperation among members.
Candor about the next phase. Turkish defense officials regularly state that engines, advanced sensors and some materials remain priority areas. Ankara argues that the aggregate rate reflects the transformation of the industry, not that the work is complete, and that programs such as the TF35000 engine for KAAN are designed to close the remaining gaps.

Primary sources for these statements are the SSB and MSB official websites, public statements by the Presidency and the Directorate of Communications, and official NATO documents. For guidance on citing them, see The Source Map and Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

Source Comparison

The contrast in framing is largely one of emphasis. Both sides can be correct about different parts of the picture.

Question	Turkish official framing	Independent analysts / foreign media framing
What does '80 percent' mean?	A headline localization rate for the sector, reflecting growth from a low base	An aggregate that needs a published methodology and breakdown
Are key components imported?	Acknowledged as a priority; domestic substitutes being developed	Highlighted as the main constraint on autonomy and export freedom
Role of licensing and partners	Part of normal industrial development, including with allies	Evidence that some programs are not fully indigenous
Effect of export restrictions	Motivated the push to localize after 2019	Accelerated localization, but also exposed supply-chain gaps
Operational record	Proven in counter-terrorism and maritime missions	Often judged on battlefield impact in several conflicts, with mixed caveats
Strategic meaning	Strategic force multiplier and NATO contribution	A rising middle power using industry as foreign-policy leverage

A careful reader will therefore treat the 80 percent figure as a Turkish official claim, not as an independently audited statistic, while also recognizing that the broader trend, from importer to significant producer and exporter, is documented by independent datasets. For help reading official language, see How to Read a Turkish Foreign Ministry Statement. For a complementary explanation of the number, see Record of Nations.

Domestic production (localization) rate: An indicator of how much of a program's content, value or activity is carried out within the country. Definitions differ between governments.
Design authority: The entity that controls a system's technical design and can modify or export it without third-party permission.
Critical subsystem: A part without which a platform cannot perform its core function, such as an engine, seeker or radar.
Licensed production: Manufacture under a foreign design licence, often with technology transfer, as in the case of Fırtına.
Force multiplier: A capability that increases the effectiveness of existing forces without proportionally increasing their size.
Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction doctrine covering the Black Sea, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG: Terrorist organizations as designated by Türkiye; the PKK is also listed by the United States, NATO and the European Union.

Related guides on this site:

Also see the sister publication Monitor of Nations on how the domestic rate developed over time.

Perspective Note

Bythetext presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. This article was prepared by the Bythetext Editorial Team.

Frequently asked questions

Is it true that Türkiye's defense industry is 80 percent domestic?

Turkish officials, including the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), state that the domestic production rate is around 80 percent. It is an official aggregate indicator rather than an independently audited figure, and the detailed methodology is not widely published. Independent analysts accept the strong growth trend but caution that the figure does not describe each platform.

Does 80 percent mean every weapon is fully made in Türkiye?

No. A localization rate can include design, integration, assembly and component manufacture at different levels. Some platforms still use imported engines, sensors or electronic parts, while others are produced under licence or co-developed with foreign partners.

Which parts of Turkish systems are most often cited as imported?

Engines are the most frequently cited, for example on early Akıncı aircraft, on Hürjet and on the KAAN prototype, along with some sensors and electronic components. Turkish officials acknowledge these as priority areas and point to programs such as TEI's TF35000 engine for KAAN as efforts to replace them.

Why did Türkiye push for localization after 2019?

After Operation Peace Spring in 2019, several European governments restricted arms exports to Türkiye and Canada suspended certain sensor exports. Türkiye was also removed from the F-35 program in 2019, and the SSB was sanctioned by the United States under CAATSA in December 2020. Ankara argues that these events showed the strategic risk of depending on foreign suppliers.

How does the defense industry relate to NATO?

Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952, and Ankara says its domestic industry strengthens the Alliance and allied cooperation. NATO members agreed at the 2025 Hague summit to raise defense and security spending targets. Turkish officials link this to more industrial cooperation, while analysts also note the political frictions over procurement within the Alliance.

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