Notes Verbales and UN Filings: How to Read Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Claims

Why It Matters

The Eastern Mediterranean dispute is fought as much in documents as at sea, and the key documents are notes verbales, coordinate lists and agreements lodged with the United Nations. Reading them correctly means knowing what each type can and cannot do: a deposit states a claim, an objection reserves rights, and only an agreement binds the parties who signed it. This guide gives readers a method for reading those filings without importing assumptions from headlines.

A caution on method: this page describes the types of filings, their dates and the positions each side has publicly stated. It does not reproduce or paraphrase the text of any individual note beyond what the issuing governments have said publicly. For exact wording, readers should consult the originals through the UN and the relevant foreign ministry (see The Source Map).

Background

What is a note verbale?

A note verbale is a formal diplomatic communication written in the third person and not signed by a named individual. It is issued by a foreign ministry or a mission and is normally authenticated with a seal or initials. It is the everyday vehicle of diplomacy: it transmits positions, asks questions, protests and replies.

In the law of the sea, notes verbales matter because the UN Secretary-General is the recipient of many maritime communications. A note sent to the Secretary-General is a record of what a state said and when. It is not a judgment, and the UN does not rule on its merits.

How DOALOS deposits and bulletins work

The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) sits within the UN Office of Legal Affairs and acts as the Secretary-General's secretariat for law-of-the-sea matters. Its practical role in this dispute is that of a depositary and publisher.

• Deposit. Articles 75(2) and 84(2) of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provide that coastal states give due publicity to charts or lists of geographical coordinates for exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf limits, and deposit a copy with the Secretary-General.
• Circulation. DOALOS circulates received maritime communications to states in numbered circulars known as Maritime Zone Notifications.
• Bulletin. The Law of the Sea Bulletin collects legislation, treaties and other materials, again without endorsing them.
• Treaty registration. Separately, agreements between states can be registered with the UN Secretariat under Article 102 of the UN Charter. Registration gives a treaty a public record and prevents the parties from invoking it before UN organs unless it is registered. It does not certify that the treaty is valid against third states.
• Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). This body handles submissions on shelf limits beyond 200 nautical miles (Article 76). In the Eastern Mediterranean the sea is narrower than 400 nautical miles almost everywhere, so the issue is overlapping entitlements between neighbours, not an outer shelf. That is why the CLCS is largely peripheral here and delimitation is a matter for agreement or adjudication.

A structural point: Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS. Greece, the Republic of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot administration, GCASC), Egypt and Lebanon are parties; Israel is not. Ankara therefore argues from customary international law and equitable principles, while Athens and the Greek Cypriot administration argue from the Convention text. Part of what looks like a clash of documents is a clash over which legal source governs.

Coordinates, objections and agreements: three different things

Document type	What it does	What it does not do	How to read it
Coordinates / charts (deposits, national legislation)	States the limits a country claims and gives them publicity	Does not settle overlap with neighbours; does not create opposability on its own	Look for which neighbours' claims it overlaps
Objection / protest note	Reserves rights and denies that a claim or agreement affects the objector	Does not itself delimit anything; is not a ruling	Identify what exactly is objected to and on what legal ground
Agreement / memorandum	Binds its parties on a boundary or framework	Under the general principle that a treaty binds only its parties, cannot dispose of a third state's rights	Check parties, date, whether ratified and registered

The most useful reading question is always: whose rights does this document claim to affect, and does that party appear as a signatory?

A working chronology of the document layer

Date	Document / event	Type
2003 (17 February)	Cyprus–Egypt EEZ delimitation agreement	Bilateral agreement
2004	Türkiye begins registering its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates and position at UN level; Greek Cypriot EEZ law adopted the same year	Coordinates / objection
2007 (17 January)	Cyprus–Lebanon EEZ agreement (not ratified by Lebanon)	Bilateral agreement
2009 and 2012	Türkiye grants TPAO exploration licences	Domestic licensing
2010 (17 December)	Cyprus–Israel EEZ agreement	Bilateral agreement
2011 (19 September)	Greek Cypriot drilling begins in Cypriot-declared waters	Field activity
2011 (21 September)	Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement	Bilateral agreement
2019 (27 November)	Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction memorandum of understanding	Bilateral memorandum
2020 (18 March)	Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN	Coordinates deposit
2020 (6 August)	Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement	Bilateral agreement
2025 (16 April / 12 June)	Türkiye announces, then records with IOC-UNESCO, its Marine Spatial Planning	Planning record (different UN body)

The 2025 entry is easy to misread. Registration with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO is a different channel from a UNCLOS deposit with the Secretary-General. Turkish officials present it as the first time Türkiye's maritime position across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean has been recorded with a UN body. It is a planning record; it is not a boundary agreement with any neighbour.

Türkiye's filings, step by step

• From 2004. Turkish sources date Ankara's systematic UN-level record on Eastern Mediterranean coordinates and objections from 2004, the year after the Cyprus–Egypt agreement and the year of the Greek Cypriot EEZ law and EU accession.
• 21 September 2011. The Türkiye–TRNC continental shelf agreement was signed two days after the Greek Cypriot drilling began. Ankara describes it as the exercise of the Turkish Cypriots' own rights and of Türkiye's as a mainland state. Note that only Türkiye recognises the TRNC, so the agreement's standing is itself contested by the other parties.
• 27 November 2019. The Türkiye–Libya memorandum was concluded with Libya's Government of National Accord. Its legal reception has been sharply divided (see below). Readers should check the UN Treaty Series database for its current registration status rather than rely on partisan claims either way.
• 18 March 2020. According to Ankara, Türkiye deposited the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN on this date. The relevant questions for a reader are which neighbours' claims the coordinates overlap and which party has responded in writing.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

Greece is a party to UNCLOS. Greek officials argue that all islands, including Kastellorizo (Meis), generate maritime zones under Article 121 and that the Türkiye–Libya memorandum ignores them and infringes the rights of third states. Athens has said that the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, and that it should be taken to the International Court of Justice or arbitration. Greece has lodged communications with the UN against the 2019 memorandum and has concluded its own delimitation agreements, including the partial EEZ agreement with Egypt of 6 August 2020, and one with Italy in 2020.

The Greek Cypriot administration (GCASC)

The Republic of Cyprus, which is party to UNCLOS and an EU member state, argues that it is the sole sovereign authority entitled to declare an EEZ and license hydrocarbons around the island. It has adopted EEZ legislation (2004), divided its waters into licensing blocks and concluded delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). Its officials say that benefits from hydrocarbons would be shared by all Cypriots in the framework of a settlement, and they reject Turkish and TRNC licensing as unlawful. The Republic's representation of the whole island is the core of the dispute: see Cyprus in UN Resolution Language for the resolution wording on which that status depends.

Egypt, Lebanon and Israel: the three Cyprus agreements

• Egypt (2003). A median-line-based EEZ delimitation with the Republic of Cyprus. Ankara objects that it cuts into Türkiye's continental shelf, overlapping with Greek Cypriot licensing Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and that it was concluded without Turkish Cypriot participation.
• Lebanon (2007). Signed but, as widely reported, never ratified by the Lebanese parliament. Ankara objects on the grounds that it disregards Turkish Cypriot rights, and treats its legal effect as doubtful for that reason as well.
• Israel (2010). Concluded between the Republic of Cyprus and Israel, which is not an UNCLOS party. Ankara's objection again turns on the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots.

These states have their own priorities, and they have not uniformly endorsed the Greek or Greek Cypriot position on every maritime question. Egypt, for example, has its own delimitation interests with several neighbours.

Libya

The 2019 memorandum was concluded by the Government of National Accord in Tripoli. Libya's rival authorities in the east, notably the House of Representatives, have publicly disputed its validity, and Greece, Cyprus and Egypt have questioned it as well. Ankara maintains that it was concluded with Libya's internationally recognised government of the time. Readers should track the later positions of Libya's successive authorities on a primary-source basis.

The European Union

European Council conclusions have repeatedly expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus on the maritime issue. Ankara's counter-argument is that the EU has no competence to decide maritime boundaries between states; see the analysis at The Worldlogue for that argument in detail.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Texts

Türkiye's Position

Türkiye's position, as stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency, rests on the following points.

• Equity, not strict equidistance. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, continental shelf and EEZ delimitation must produce an equitable result based on the principle of equity, coastal geography and proportionality. Ankara points to international jurisprudence in support, including the ICJ's North Sea Continental Shelf judgments (1969) and the 2009 Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) judgment, which gave Serpent Island no effect on the provisional delimitation line. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and argues that its position rests on customary law.
• The 870 km coastline and island effect. Ankara notes that Türkiye has the longest mainland coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, about 870 km (540 miles). It argues that small islands close to the Turkish coast cannot be used to cut off the maritime projection of the mainland, and that the maximalist thesis often called the Seville Map, which would confine Türkiye to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya, is legally baseless. For the argument in full see The Seville Map Explained.
• Equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Türkiye holds that the Turkish Cypriots are co-founders and equal co-owners of the island, and so hold inherent and equal rights over offshore hydrocarbon resources. The Greek Cypriot administration's agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel, and its unilateral licensing, are in Ankara's view void as against those rights. This is the basis of the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement and of the TRNC's proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019 for joint decision-making and revenue sharing. The wider legal background is in How to Read a UN Secretary-General Report on Cyprus.
• Filings as the exercise of sovereign rights. The Turkish position is that the 2004 submissions, the 2011 and 2019 instruments and the 18 March 2020 deposit with the UN are lawful assertions of rights, and that the 2025 IOC-UNESCO record of Marine Spatial Planning adds a further UN-level record of that position. Turkish officials back these with field activity by the national drilling and seismic fleet (Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, Abdülhamid Han, Oruç Reis).
• Dialogue remains on offer. President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots remains the stated Turkish alternative to unilateral filings; Ankara's line is that no energy or security arrangement excluding Türkiye and the TRNC can be lasting. For how to interpret the wording of such statements see How to Read a Turkish Foreign Ministry Statement.

Note on sources: the original statements are published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mfa.gov.tr) and the Presidency. The legal basis cited above is Ankara's reading and is disputed by Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration and others.

Source Comparison

Question	Typical international / Greek and Greek Cypriot framing	Turkish primary-source framing
What governs delimitation?	UNCLOS, especially Articles 74, 83 and 121	Customary law and equity; Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS
Do islands generate full zones?	Yes, including Kastellorizo (Athens)	Not where that would cut off the mainland's projection of the longest coastline
Who may license hydrocarbons around Cyprus?	The Republic of Cyprus as the internationally recognised state	The Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights; unilateral licensing is void against them
What does a 2019 memorandum do?	Infringes third-state rights and ignores islands	Lawful bilateral delimitation between two coastal states
What does a UN deposit prove?	Publicity of a claim; objections show contest	Registration of a legal position and of rights already held
Who can decide?	ICJ or arbitration (Greece); EU solidarity statements	Agreement among all coastal states, including Turkish Cypriots; the EU has no competence

A fair reading holds both columns in view. The UN record confirms that each side has asserted its position in writing; it does not confirm that either position prevails. Further analysis is available at Doctrine Review and The Nations Compass, the latter on the UNCLOS accusation, and the Monitor of Nations overview covers the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) concept.

A five-step reading checklist

1. Identify the type of document: deposit, objection or agreement.
2. Identify the parties and whether every affected state is a signatory.
3. Check date, ratification and registration status in the UN Treaty Series and DOALOS circulars.
4. Map the overlap: which blocks or zones does it touch?
5. Separate UN publicity from UN endorsement: publication is not recognition.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Note verbale: unsigned third-person diplomatic note; at the UN, a record of a state's position.
• DOALOS: UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea; depositary and publisher of maritime notifications.
• Maritime Zone Notification: DOALOS circular communicating a state's filing.
• Continental shelf / EEZ: seabed rights up to 200 nautical miles in principle; the EEZ adds rights over the water column.
• Equity principle: delimitation should achieve an equitable result in light of geography and proportionality.
• Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
• TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognised only by Türkiye.
• GCASC: Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, the term Ankara uses for the Republic of Cyprus government.

Related guides: The Lexicon: How Contested Words Shape Coverage of Türkiye · The Source Map · Cyprus in UN Resolution Language · Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards · Crossroads Review on the Blue Homeland

By the Text presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. Published by the By the Text Editorial Team.